On 7 October 2025, Gibson DCJ of the District Court of New South Wales delivered an ex parte interlocutory decision in Kurraba Group Pty Ltd & Anor v Williams [2025] NSWDC 396 that has been described by commentators as a legal milestone — the first published Australian judgment applying the new statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy under Schedule 2 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ([Corrs Chambers Westgarth](https://www.cbp.com.au/insights/publications/putting-the-privacy-tort-to-the-test-first-application-for-relief-under-the-statutory-tort-for-seri)). Just as significantly for defamation practitioners, the decision was handed down in the NSW District Court’s Defamation List by Gibson DCJ — arguably the most experienced defamation judge in Australia — and it demonstrates how the new privacy tort will run in parallel with existing defamation causes of action in cases of online publication.
This case note examines the facts, the issues, the interlocutory disposition, the doctrinal significance of the privacy tort application, and the practical implications for plaintiffs and defendants in publication cases.
Background and Facts
The first plaintiff, Kurraba Group Pty Ltd, is a Sydney-based real estate development firm. The second plaintiff, Nicholas Smith, is Kurraba’s CEO and the sole director and shareholder of a related entity, Botany Road Development Pty Ltd, which owned the relevant development site at 100 Botany Road, Alexandria. In June 2024 Kurraba announced its intention to lodge a development application for that site, which included premises at Wyndham Street, Alexandria.
At about the same time, the Wyndham Street premises were listed for short-term rental. The defendant, Michael Williams, inquired about leasing the property. He was informed of the planned redevelopment. Williams nonetheless entered, through his company Glexia Pty Ltd, a six-month lease over the premises. With two months left on the lease, Williams sent the second plaintiff a text claiming the development would disrupt his business and breach various laws, stating his intention to oppose the development application.
At a meeting on 11 November 2024, Williams demanded $50,000 from the plaintiffs to drop his objections to the development application, citing his past success in disputes with other large corporations. The demand was refused. Between November 2024 and March 2025 Williams escalated, submitting 64 pages of objections, posting a one-star Google review of Kurraba, making oral submissions to the planning committee, and creating a website titled “Kurraba Group Exposed” that published serious allegations against both plaintiffs (failed past ventures, deceptive rebranding, questionable qualifications, broken promises, financial desperation, legal intimidation of critics, conflicts of interest and regulatory evasion).
Critically, Williams also published the second plaintiff’s private wedding photographs without consent, deploying them in a manner said to imply moral delinquency and drunkenness, rather than the sanctity of marriage. The proceedings filed on 2 October 2025 sought interlocutory relief in respect of three causes of action: defamation, the new statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy (in respect of the second plaintiff), and intimidation.
The Statutory Privacy Tort — A Brief Primer
Schedule 2 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) commenced on 10 June 2025 and creates, for the first time in Australia, a statutory cause of action in tort for serious invasions of privacy. Clause 7 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 requires a plaintiff to establish:
- the defendant intruded on the plaintiff’s seclusion and/or misused the plaintiff’s personal information;
- a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy;
- the invasion was intentional or reckless;
- the invasion was serious; and
- the public interest in protecting the plaintiff’s privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest (for example, the public interest in freedom of expression or journalism).
The tort is restricted to natural persons (corporate plaintiffs cannot rely on it directly), which is why only the second plaintiff in Kurraba sought relief on this cause. A suite of statutory exemptions sits alongside the tort, including the journalism exception in clause 15 of Schedule 2. We discussed the tort’s commencement and how it interacts with defamation in our earlier piece on the privacy tort and defamation in Australia.
Issues
On the ex parte interlocutory application, Gibson DCJ had to consider:
- Was there a serious question to be tried in respect of each of the three causes of action (defamation, privacy, intimidation)?
- Did the balance of convenience favour granting the relief sought?
- Specifically as to the privacy cause: did the second plaintiff have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the impugned material (in particular, the wedding photographs)? Was the invasion serious? Did the public interest in privacy outweigh the public interest in publication?
- Did any statutory exception apply — in particular, the journalism exception?
Decision
Her Honour was satisfied there was a serious question to be tried in relation to each cause of action and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs. Interlocutory relief was granted.
On the privacy cause, Gibson DCJ accepted that the second plaintiff and his wife were not public figures, that they had no intention of publishing their wedding photographs to any mass-media organisation, and that the publication on the “Kurraba Group Exposed” website was a misuse of their personal information that crossed the threshold of seriousness. The defendant’s conduct could not avail itself of the journalism exception because, as Her Honour pointed out, the conduct was “not that of journalistic-style investigation, but of extortion”.
Her Honour acknowledged at [17] the well-known forensic difficulty in describing conduct alleged to be a serious invasion of privacy — that the act of describing the impugned publication in detail can itself increase the harm — and limited her commentary accordingly.
The Court made interlocutory orders restraining Williams from publishing any document referring to or identifying the plaintiffs or the development, requiring him to take down within two days any existing website, article or other publication referring to or identifying them, and restraining him from inciting any third party to engage in the same conduct ([Corrs Chambers Westgarth](https://www.cbp.com.au/insights/publications/putting-the-privacy-tort-to-the-test-first-application-for-relief-under-the-statutory-tort-for-seri)).
Analysis: What Practitioners Should Take From the Decision
1. The privacy tort is alive and useful at the interlocutory stage
Until Kurraba, the new statutory privacy tort was untested. Practitioners had been speculating about how courts would treat the “serious invasion” threshold, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” element, and the “balance of public interests” calibration. Kurraba shows that at least one experienced specialist judge will treat the tort as a genuine source of relief, including interlocutory relief, on a real-world set of facts. The decision turns the tort from a theoretical regime into a live litigation tool.
2. Privacy claims pair well with defamation claims — and often capture different conduct
The defamation cause of action in Kurraba targeted the textual allegations on the “Kurraba Group Exposed” website. The privacy cause targeted the misuse of the wedding photographs — conduct that may not have satisfied the elements of defamation (it is not obvious that wedding photographs published in a particular framing convey defamatory imputations on the ordinary, reasonable reader test) but that clearly fits the privacy tort. The two causes are complementary, and a plaintiff with both available is materially better placed.
This is doctrinally significant. Practitioners advising clients on online attack campaigns should now reflexively assess three potential causes: defamation, intimidation, and serious invasion of privacy. The first two have been with us; the third is new and will increasingly be deployed in cases involving the publication of intimate or personal material that does not turn on imputation.
3. The journalism exception will be construed strictly
Her Honour’s observation that the defendant’s conduct was “not that of journalistic-style investigation, but of extortion” is the first judicial gloss on the journalism exception. It is unlikely to be the last. Defendants who attempt to clothe a personal-grievance publication in the language of public-interest investigation will face a strict test — one that asks whether the conduct in substance amounts to journalism, not whether it has the form of an article or a website. The threshold for the exception is meaningfully higher than the threshold for the section 29A public interest defence under the Defamation Act.
4. Corporate plaintiffs cannot sue under the privacy tort
The structure of Kurraba is itself instructive: Kurraba Group Pty Ltd ran the defamation cause, while only the second plaintiff (the natural person, Mr Smith) advanced the privacy cause. This is a deliberate feature of the statute. Practitioners acting for corporate plaintiffs should join an appropriate natural-person co-plaintiff (a director, an executive, a beneficial owner) where the campaign of attack includes misuse of that individual’s personal information.
5. The interlocutory standard is not as high as in pure defamation cases
Australian courts have long been cautious about granting interlocutory injunctions in defamation matters because of the strong constitutional and common-law preference for free speech (see, classically, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57). The privacy tort does not carry the same gravitational pull. Where a privacy invasion is established at the “serious question to be tried” threshold and the balance of convenience favours the plaintiff, an injunction may issue without the same constitutional headwinds. For practitioners seeking interlocutory takedowns, the privacy cause may be the more efficient vehicle. Compare our deeper treatment in the defamation injunction guide.
6. Ex parte applications remain available but the bar is high
Kurraba was an ex parte application, which means the defendant was not heard before the interlocutory orders were made. Courts will only entertain such applications where the urgency is established and the duty of full and frank disclosure is discharged. Plaintiffs considering an ex parte approach must arm their counsel with a comprehensive affidavit, including disclosure of any material that the defendant might raise.
Practical Implications
For Australian practitioners and litigants, the practical implications of Kurraba v Williams are these:
- Three causes of action, not one. In every online-attack matter, assess defamation, intimidation and serious invasion of privacy. The combination materially increases the range of relief and the leverage at settlement.
- Capture and preserve the publication immediately. Privacy claims, like defamation claims, are evidence-intensive. Screenshots, archive captures, metadata, and copies of the impugned material should be secured before any concerns notice is sent. Read our practical playbook in the content removal guide.
- Identify the natural-person plaintiff early. Where the corporate entity holds the goodwill, the privacy claim still needs a natural-person plaintiff — the executive, the founder, the family member.
- Don’t skip the concerns notice. Even where the privacy tort opens an interlocutory route, the defamation cause continues to require a compliant concerns notice under sections 12A and 12B of the Defamation Act 2005. The two pathways run in parallel.
- Anticipate journalism defences and prepare to defeat them. The journalism exception will be argued by media organisations and pseudo-journalists alike. Strong factual material distinguishing extortion or personal grievance from journalism will defeat the exception, as it did in Kurraba.
How Matrix Legal Can Help
Matrix Legal acts for plaintiffs and defendants in reputation, defamation and now privacy matters across Australia. Mark Stanarevic personally drafts every concerns notice and personally settles every interlocutory application. The intersection of defamation and the new statutory privacy tort is a rapidly evolving area, and our practice has been monitoring its commencement closely since 10 June 2025. If you are facing an online attack campaign that combines defamatory publications with the misuse of personal information — or if you need urgent interlocutory takedown relief — the next step is a free written assessment. We will review the publications, identify the causes of action, evaluate the case for interlocutory relief and damages, and give you a candid view of your prospects before you commit. Request a free assessment or call 1800 950 627.
This article is general information and not legal advice. Defamation risk turns on the precise words used, the publication context, the audience, and available evidence.