Defamation Injunctions in Australia: Stopping Defamatory Publications Before and After Trial

Why Injunctions Matter in Defamation

Defamation claims typically result in an award of damages. But money cannot always undo the harm. When defamatory material remains online, is being republished, or is about to be published for the first time, the plaintiff's priority is often to stop the publication rather than to wait months or years for a judgment and a cheque. That is where injunctions come in.

An injunction is a court order that compels a person to do something (a mandatory injunction) or restrains them from doing something (a prohibitory injunction). In the defamation context, injunctions typically take one of three forms:

• Interlocutory (interim) injunctions — temporary orders restraining publication before the case goes to trial;
• Permanent (final) injunctions — orders made after judgment, permanently restraining the defendant from republishing the defamatory material; and
• Digital intermediary takedown orders — orders directed at platforms, search engines, and hosting providers under the Stage 2 defamation reforms.

Each carries different legal tests, practical considerations, and strategic implications. This guide addresses all three.

Interlocutory Injunctions: The Bonnard v Perryman Threshold

The most urgent form of injunctive relief in defamation is the interlocutory injunction — an order restraining publication before the matter is determined at trial. It is also the most difficult to obtain.

The governing principle in Australian law derives from the English Court of Appeal decision in Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, which established that courts should not grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of an alleged libel where the defendant asserts that it intends to justify the statement (that is, prove it is true) or to rely on another substantive defence. The rationale is rooted in the protection of free speech: if there is a defence to be tried, the court should not pre-empt that trial by suppressing the publication.

The High Court of Australia affirmed the cautious approach to interlocutory injunctions in defamation in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57. Gleeson CJ and Crennan J observed that the general principles governing interlocutory injunctions — serious question to be tried, balance of convenience, and adequacy of damages — apply, but that "the public interest in free speech" requires particular caution in defamation matters.

When will an interlocutory injunction be granted?

Despite the high threshold, interlocutory injunctions are granted in defamation cases in exceptional circumstances. The case law identifies several situations where courts have been willing to intervene:

• No arguable defence: Where the defendant does not assert truth, honest opinion, qualified privilege, or any other substantive defence, or where the asserted defence is manifestly untenable, the Bonnard v Perryman constraint does not apply.
• Repeated publications with a "vendetta" character: In Yap v Matic [2022] WASC 181, Solomon J granted an interlocutory injunction where the defendant's conduct had what the court described as the "flavour of a vendetta" against the plaintiff, involving repeated and escalating publications.
• Prior court findings ignored: Where a defendant has continued to publish material previously found to be defamatory — demonstrating defiance of the court's processes — an injunction is more readily available. In Brewer v Bayens (No 2), the respondent had failed to comply with an earlier order to remove publications, providing grounds for apprehension of continued publication.
• Harassment causing third-party action: Justice John Dixon in a Victorian Supreme Court matter held that "publication that causes circumstances of harassment of a plaintiff by third parties constitutes exceptional circumstances that may warrant injunctive relief."

Practical requirements for applicants

A plaintiff seeking an interlocutory injunction in a defamation case must typically demonstrate:

1. A serious question to be tried — that is, a prima facie case that the material is defamatory and that the plaintiff is identifiable;
2. That damages would not be an adequate remedy — for example, because the defamatory material is continuing to spread online and cannot be effectively remedied by a later award of compensation;
3. That the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction — including the relative hardship to each party and the public interest in free expression;
4. That the defendant has no arguable defence, or that the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional to override the Bonnard v Perryman constraint.

Speed is critical. Where defamatory material is being published online and spreading rapidly, an application for an ex parte interim injunction — that is, an application made without notice to the defendant — may be appropriate to preserve the status quo for a very brief period until both parties can be heard. Courts will grant ex parte orders only in genuinely urgent cases, and typically for no more than a few days.

Permanent Injunctions After Judgment

Even after a plaintiff succeeds at trial and obtains a damages award, a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from republishing the defamatory material is not automatic. This is a point that many clients find surprising.

The leading recent authority is Greenwich v Latham (No 2) [2025] FCA 131, in which Justice O'Callaghan of the Federal Court refused a permanent injunction following a successful defamation claim by the politician Alexander Greenwich against Mark Latham. Despite awarding $100,000 in damages and $40,000 in aggravated damages, the Court held that a permanent injunction was not warranted because there was no real or appreciable risk that Latham would republish the specific defamatory material.

The test for a permanent injunction

Justice O'Callaghan noted that permanent injunctions restraining republication of defamatory material have "until recently" been "rarely sought" in Australia. Unlike the position in England — where permanent injunctions are described as "the natural remedy that flows from the Court's decision" — in Australia, the plaintiff must demonstrate:

• A real risk of republication: The longstanding principle from Proctor v Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390 is that "an injunction is granted for prevention, and where there is no ground for apprehending the repetition of a wrongful act there is no ground for an injunction."
• An additional factor beyond mere possibility: As Jagot J held in Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) (2015) 237 FCR 127 at 130, injunctions are typically issued only when "some additional factor is evident — usually, an apprehension that the respondent may, by reason of irrationality, defiance, disrespect of the court's judgment or otherwise, publish allegations similar to those found to be defamatory unless restrained from doing so."

The factors the court considers in assessing whether to grant a permanent injunction were summarised in Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 9) [2019] FCA 1383 at [29]:

• The extent of the risk of republication;
• The seriousness of the defamation;
• The hardship the plaintiff would suffer if the defamation was repeated;
• The burden on the plaintiff if required to commence further proceedings; and
• Whether a permanent injunction would avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

When permanent injunctions have been granted

By contrast with Greenwich v Latham, permanent injunctions have been granted where there is clear evidence of intention or likelihood to republish. In Chau v Australian Broadcasting Corp (No 3) [2021] FCA 44; (2021) 386 ALR 36, Justice Rares granted a final injunction because "the publishers have made clear, they intend to continue publishing it and so making those imputations that I have found to be false, seriously defamatory and otherwise indefensible."

Similarly, in the NSW District Court decision in Martin v Najem [2022], Judge Gibson granted a permanent injunction where the defendant had engaged in a sustained campaign of defamatory social media posts against a rival food blogger. The court held it had the power to grant permanent injunctions in defamation proceedings, clarifying a point of uncertainty about District Court jurisdiction in New South Wales.

Digital Intermediary Takedown Orders: The Stage 2 Reforms

One of the most significant developments in Australian defamation law has been the introduction of powers to make orders against digital intermediaries — online platforms, search engines, hosting providers, and other services — that are not parties to the defamation proceedings.

Under the previous law, a court could only make an injunction against a party to the proceedings. This meant that if a plaintiff sued the author of a defamatory social media post but not the platform (such as Facebook, Google, or X), the court could not order the platform to remove the material. The plaintiff would need to commence separate proceedings against the platform itself — a costly and impractical exercise, particularly against large multinational corporations.

The Stage 2 defamation reforms address this gap. Under the new provisions (enacted as section 37A or equivalent in jurisdictions that have adopted the reforms, including South Australia from 15 December 2025 and Queensland under the Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025), a court that has decided in favour of a plaintiff or granted a temporary or final injunction may order a non-party digital intermediary to:

• Take access prevention steps (such as removing, blocking, disabling, or preventing access to the defamatory material);
• Take other steps the court considers necessary to prevent or limit the continued publication or republication of the defamatory material; or
• Take steps to comply with or give effect to a court judgment or injunction that prevents the defendant from continuing to publish or republish the material.

Critically, these orders can be made regardless of whether the digital intermediary itself would be liable for defamation — for example, because it benefits from a statutory exemption or the new digital intermediary defence.

Procedural safeguards

The legislation requires that a digital intermediary be given an opportunity to be heard before an order is made against it. However, where the court considers it necessary for an order to be made "expeditiously" — for example, where the defamatory material is spreading rapidly online — a temporary order may be made without first hearing from the intermediary. That temporary order applies until the intermediary is given the opportunity to be heard.

This reform is particularly significant for online defamation and Google review defamation cases, where the primary harm often comes from material hosted on platforms rather than on the publisher's own website.

Strategic Considerations: When to Seek an Injunction

Not every defamation case warrants an application for injunctive relief. Injunction applications are expensive, heard urgently, and — in the case of interlocutory applications — subject to the usual undertaking as to damages (meaning the applicant may be liable for the defendant's losses if the injunction is later found to have been wrongly granted). Practitioners and clients should consider the following:

• Is the material still live? If the defamatory material has been removed, an injunction preventing republication may be unnecessary unless there is a genuine apprehension that the defendant will republish.
• Does the defendant have an arguable defence? If truth, honest opinion, or qualified privilege is in play, an interlocutory injunction is unlikely to be granted. The focus should be on expediting the trial rather than seeking pre-trial relief.
• How serious is the ongoing harm? Where defamatory material is continuing to circulate online — for example, ranking prominently in search results — the ongoing reputational damage may justify the cost and risk of an injunction application.
• Is a concerns notice a better first step? In many cases, a properly drafted concerns notice will prompt the publisher to remove the material voluntarily or to engage with the offer to make amends process, avoiding the need for court proceedings altogether.
• Can a digital intermediary order achieve the objective? In jurisdictions that have adopted the Stage 2 reforms, a takedown order against a platform may be a more cost-effective remedy than suing the platform directly.

The Interaction Between Injunctions and the Serious Harm Requirement

Since the introduction of the serious harm threshold under the 2021 amendments to the uniform Defamation Act 2005, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defamatory publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to reputation. This threshold applies at the outset of the proceedings and may be relevant to an interlocutory injunction application.

If a plaintiff cannot establish that the publication meets the serious harm threshold, the proceedings themselves may be vulnerable to an application for summary dismissal — and an interlocutory injunction is unlikely to be granted in circumstances where the underlying claim may not survive. Conversely, if the serious harm threshold is clearly met, this supports the argument that damages alone will be an inadequate remedy and that injunctive relief is warranted.

How Matrix Legal Can Help

Injunction applications in defamation cases are among the most demanding forms of civil litigation. They require rapid preparation, detailed evidence, and a thorough understanding of both the substantive law and the court's procedural requirements. They are also time-sensitive: delay in seeking an injunction can itself be used against the applicant as evidence that the matter is not truly urgent.

At Matrix Legal, Mark Stanarevic acts for both plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief and defendants resisting it. Whether you need to stop the publication of defamatory material, obtain a takedown order against a social media platform, or defend an injunction application, contact us for a confidential assessment of your position and the remedies available to you.

This article is general information and not legal advice. Defamation risk turns on the precise words used, the publication context, the audience, and available evidence.