On 27 August 2025 Tottle J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia delivered judgment in Reynolds v Higgins [2025] WASC 345, awarding the former Western Australian senator and federal cabinet minister Linda Reynolds $315,000 in damages plus $26,109.25 in interest for two defamatory social media publications by Brittany Higgins. The decision concludes the principal civil dispute between the two women that has run alongside, and across, the parallel Lehrmann-Network Ten Federal Court litigation. For Australian defamation practitioners it is one of the most instructive social-media-defamation judgments of 2025 — not least because Western Australia retained the pre-2021 uniform Act in its older form, producing a doctrinal divergence from the rest of the country that affects every element of the analysis.
This case note examines the facts, the issues, the disposition, and the practical takeaways for anyone considering proceedings over social media publications in Australia in 2026.
Background and Facts
The plaintiff, Linda Reynolds, was the Defence Minister in March 2019 when an alleged rape took place in her ministerial suite at Parliament House. The complainant was the defendant, Brittany Higgins, then a staffer in Reynolds’ office. The accused was a fellow staffer, Bruce Lehrmann. The subsequent media coverage, criminal trial (later aborted), Federal Court defamation action by Lehrmann against Network Ten and Lisa Wilkinson, and Higgins’ $2.4 million Commonwealth compensation payment together produced a national reckoning over workplace sexual harassment in 2021 and 2022.
Reynolds’ defamation action against Higgins concerned four social media publications:
- A reply to a tweet by David Sharaz (then Higgins’ partner) on 27 January 2022, in which Higgins responded “I have no words” with a zipper emoji;
- An Instagram story published on 4 July 2023, comprising screenshots of news headlines about Reynolds’ referral of Higgins’ compensation payment to the National Anti-Corruption Commission, combined with Higgins’ own commentary;
- Two tweets dated 20 July 2023 implying that Reynolds wished to silence victims of sexual assault; and
- A breach-of-contract claim arising from a 2021 settlement deed between Reynolds and Higgins that included a non-disparagement clause.
Reynolds also added a conspiracy claim shortly before trial, alleging that Higgins and Sharaz had agreed on a plan, the sole or predominant purpose of which was to injure her. A separate action against Sharaz had earlier been resolved by consent judgment on 24 May 2024.
The WA Doctrinal Setting
A central, often-missed feature of this case is the legal framework. Western Australia adopted the original uniform Defamation Act 2005 but did not adopt the Stage 1 amendments commenced on 1 July 2021 in most other Australian jurisdictions. The practical consequences are significant:
- There is no statutory serious harm threshold under section 10A in WA. A plaintiff need not plead or prove serious harm to reputation as an element of the cause of action ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/a-court-has-found-brittany-higgins-defamed-linda-reynolds-heres-why-235967)).
- The single publication rule for cause-of-action accrual was not adopted in WA, leaving the older common law multiple publication rule in play.
- The new public interest defence in section 29A was not enacted in WA. Defendants must rely on the older statutory qualified privilege under section 30, common law Lange qualified privilege, honest opinion, fair comment, and substantial truth.
- The compulsory concerns notice regime under sections 12A and 12B does not operate in its post-2021 form in WA.
For practitioners advising clients located in or sued in Western Australia, these differences materially change the litigation strategy from the rest of the country. Compare our discussion of the serious harm threshold as it applies in Victoria and New South Wales.
Issues
The action presented Tottle J with seven principal issues:
- Did each of the four publications convey the imputations pleaded by Reynolds?
- Was Higgins a publisher of the 27 January 2022 reply tweet, given that the impugned matter consisted of the reply combined with Sharaz’s original tweet?
- Should the limitation period for the 27 January 2022 tweet be extended under section 56A of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA)?
- Did Higgins establish any defence — justification (section 25), contextual truth (section 26), statutory qualified privilege (section 30), Lange qualified privilege, honest opinion (section 31), or common law fair comment?
- Was the case made out for ordinary, aggravated and special damages?
- Was a conspiracy to injure established between Higgins and Sharaz?
- Did Higgins breach the non-disparagement clause of the 2021 deed of settlement?
Decision
The 4 July 2023 Instagram Story — $180,000
His Honour found the Instagram story conveyed three defamatory imputations: that Reynolds was engaged in a campaign of harassing Higgins, that Reynolds had mishandled the allegation of rape made by Higgins, and that Reynolds had engaged in questionable conduct in the course of the criminal trial ([CaseNote AU](https://casenote.au/cases/reynolds-v-higgins-2)). None of the defences raised by Higgins was established. The award of $180,000 included aggravated damages reflecting the manner of publication and Higgins’ conduct after publication.
The 27 January 2022 Reply Tweet — $135,000
Tottle J held that Higgins had participated in the publication of the 27 January 2022 tweet in such a way as to make her a publisher of the composite tweet (Sharaz’s tweet plus her reply) for the purposes of the law of defamation. The composite conveyed the imputations that Reynolds had pressured Higgins not to proceed with a genuine complaint of sexual assault to police, and that Reynolds is a hypocrite in her advocacy for gender equality and female empowerment. The limitation period was extended to permit the action to be brought. None of the defences was established. Damages, including aggravated damages, were $135,000 ([CaseNote AU](https://casenote.au/cases/reynolds-v-higgins-2)).
The 20 July 2023 Tweets — defended
The 20 July 2023 tweets conveyed the imputation that Reynolds wanted to silence the victims of sexual assault. While defamatory, Higgins established the defences of honest opinion, fair comment and Lange qualified privilege. The defence of justification was not established. Reynolds’ claim in respect of this publication accordingly failed ([Region Canberra](https://region.com.au/linda-reynolds-awarded-almost-350000-in-damages-after-winning-defamation-case-against-brittany-higgins/898869/)).
Conspiracy — dismissed
The conspiracy to injure was dismissed. While there was extensive evidence of co-ordination between Higgins and Sharaz, Tottle J was not satisfied that the sole or predominant purpose of any agreement between them was to injure Reynolds. There was a media-strategy purpose that, however calculated, was not exclusively malign.
Breach of contract — established
The non-disparagement clause in the 2021 deed of settlement (entered after Reynolds’ “lying cow” remark resulted in a $10,000 settlement paid by Reynolds, which Higgins donated to the Canberra Rape Crisis Centre) restricted both parties from making adverse, critical or disparaging comments about the dispute. Tottle J found Higgins had breached that clause through the 4 July 2023 Instagram story. The breach claim was declared established, with relief by way of declaration.
Analysis: What Practitioners Should Take From the Decision
1. Reply tweets and quote-tweets can make you a publisher of the original
The finding that a four-word reply (“I have no words”) and a zipper emoji constituted publication of the composite tweet is doctrinally orthodox but practically arresting. Following Voller, Australian courts have steadily expanded the category of conduct that amounts to publication on social media. A retweet, a quote-tweet, a like in some jurisdictions, a tag, a comment, or a reply that ratifies the underlying allegation are all capable of amounting to participation in publication. Anyone responding to defamatory content on social media in 2026 needs to assume their interaction is itself a publication for which they may be sued. See our deep-dive on social media defamation in Australia.
2. Honest opinion saves what truth could not
The contrast between the Instagram story (no defence available) and the 20 July 2023 tweets (defence of honest opinion successful) is instructive. The honest opinion defence under section 31 requires (a) the matter to be opinion rather than fact, (b) the opinion to relate to a matter of public interest, and (c) the opinion to be based on proper material that is substantially true. Where a publication can be framed as a value judgment plainly based on disclosed factual matrix — particularly a published submission by the plaintiff — the defence will often be available even where a justification defence will not.
3. Aggravated damages flow from the defendant’s conduct, not the plaintiff’s hurt
Aggravated damages were a substantial component of both awards. The plaintiff’s hurt to feelings is compensated by general damages. Aggravated damages reflect the defendant’s conduct — here, the manner of publication, the repetition of allegations after the 2021 settlement, the absence of a retraction, and the failure to give evidence. The decision is a reminder that the cap on non-economic loss damages under section 35 of the Act (in WA, the pre-2021 cap, currently around $478,550 indexed) is not the only constraint on quantum: aggravated damages, while compensatory, can lift an award materially.
4. Settlement deeds with non-disparagement clauses are enforceable and useful
This is one of the few reported Australian decisions enforcing a non-disparagement clause in a defamation settlement deed. The declaration that Higgins had breached the clause carries reputational weight independent of the damages award. Practitioners drafting settlements should consider (i) defining the prohibited communications by reference to the “conduct” in the dispute, not merely the parties, (ii) extending the clause beyond direct statements to include amplification (retweets, shares), and (iii) including a liquidated damages clause, or at minimum a stipulated forum for declaratory relief.
5. Failure to testify is not always fatal but is rarely costless
Higgins did not testify, relying on medical grounds. While Tottle J accepted the reasons for her absence, the absence of testimony left the plaintiff’s evidence largely uncontradicted on subjective intention, the circumstances of publication, and the absence of any retraction. Where a defendant does not take the stand, prior media statements, text messages and inferences from contemporaneous documents will fill the void — rarely to the defendant’s advantage.
6. Limitation extensions: justified in this case but not a precedent for laziness
The extension of time for the 27 January 2022 reply tweet was granted because of the practical difficulty of identifying it among the volume of contemporaneous publications and Reynolds’ ill-health during the relevant period. Plaintiffs should not assume similar latitude. As we have explained elsewhere, the one-year limitation period is unforgiving and extensions remain the exception.
Practical Implications
For Australian practitioners and litigants, four practical implications follow from Reynolds v Higgins:
- Audit your social media exposure quickly. If you have replied, quote-tweeted, retweeted or shared a publication that turns out to be defamatory, you may be a publisher in your own right. Take down where you can, document what you did, and seek advice before responding to a concerns notice.
- Plead honest opinion and fair comment in the alternative. The Instagram story failed for want of an opinion plea; the 20 July tweets succeeded with one. The drafting of imputations and defences is forensic work.
- If you reach a defamation settlement, draft the deed assuming it will be tested. The Reynolds-Higgins deed of March 2021 worked exactly as intended: it produced a declaratory remedy two years later.
- Conspiracy claims need a clear evidentiary spine. Even where co-ordination is documented, the requirement to prove the sole or predominant purpose is to injure remains exacting. Bring conspiracy only where the evidence is concrete; otherwise it will dilute the defamation claim.
How Matrix Legal Can Help
Matrix Legal acts for plaintiffs and defendants in social media defamation matters across Australia, including in Western Australia where the doctrinal framework differs from the rest of the country. Mark Stanarevic personally drafts every concerns notice issued by this firm and personally settles every statement of claim. We have run interlocutory and final hearings in defamation matters involving Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Facebook, Reddit and Google reviews. If you have been the subject of a social media publication, or you are concerned that something you posted, shared or replied to may have crossed the line, the next step is a free written assessment. We will review the publication, identify the imputations, assess defences and damages exposure, and give you a candid view of your prospects before you commit. Request a free assessment or call 1800 950 627.
This article is general information and not legal advice. Defamation risk turns on the precise words used, the publication context, the audience, and available evidence.